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Introduction:
The Challenge of Writing
on the Central Asian Ismailis
riting an article about Central Asian Shi‘a Ismaili Muslims represents a very challenging task for
several reasons: In geographical terms, Central Asia includes a very broad area and this makes
the region wherein perhaps the majority of modern world’s Ismailis inhabit. The Central Asian
Ismailis can be divided into three groups:
 Khurasani Ismailis, who inhabit Iran’s western-most province of Khurasan;
 Hazara Ismailis, who mainly live in the central part of Afghanistan (i.e. Kabul and the Kayan
valley of Baghlan province);
 Badakhshan Ismailis, who originate from the mountainous valleys that stretch between northeast
Afghanistan, northern areas of Pakistan, Badakhshan province of Tajikistan and Tashkurghan
district of Xinjiang province of China.
In a broad historical and cultural sense, Central Asia has always exhibited intellectual dynamism
and cultural pluralism. As a Silk Road crossroad, Central Asia has been a place where the major religions—
Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam encountered each other,
making Central Asia one of the most plural places of the medieval world. The Islamic spread in Central
Asia since the 8th century CE resulted in internal Islamic diversity, reflected in the division of the Sunnis
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and Shi‘as into their numerous subdivisions. In addition, some of the most powerful Muslim Sufi orders
such as the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Yasawiyya played a vital role in spreading Islam further east
and north of Central Asia.1  Among those Islamic forces that left their mark on history were the Ismaili
Muslims who actively spread across Muslim land from the Fatimid Egypt in the west to the Pamir Moun-
tains in the east and Multan in the south.2  Ismaili history spans more than a millennium and is not only
full of important and interesting epiphanies, but also mysteries and loopholes. While one could find more
commonalities in the early period of the Central Asian Ismaili da’wa, the subsequent political history of
the region makes it difficult to portray Central Asian Ismailis as a homogenous whole. One, therefore,
should not view the notion of Central Asian Ismailism as monolithic: while there are common principles
that bring all Central Asian Ismailis together, and while there is a shared pool of cultural practices among
them, these Ismailis also differ on many levels. One of the reasons is perhaps that the Central Asian Is-
mailis belong to specific ethnicities that are often defined in terms of geography, specific languages and
particular nation-states. Neither should the term “Ismaili” be taken as the only term that used to signify
the adherents of this school of Islam. Across history various names such as “shi‘a,” “shi‘at Ali,” “rafizi,”
“batini,” “ta’limi,” “ahli haqq,” “pairwoni rohi rost,” “panjtani,” “Aliparast” were used to refer to this
community either from internal or external perspectives.
Due to the limited scope, this article will increasingly focus on the “Tajik” Ismailis. They belong to
the larger Badakhshani Ismaili constituency and are simultaneously a vivid representation of the larger
community’s common tenets and diversity.
A Brief Historical
Journey
Tajik Ismailis, divided along the Panj River and surrounding mountains, constitute one of the larg-
est and historically oldest concentrations of Ismaili communities in the world. Their history may be di-
vided into the following periods:
 Since the spread of Ismaili ideas in Central Asia (i.e. the 8th century CE until the late 19th cen-
tury).
 From the late 19th century until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
 Post-Soviet period.
The spread of Ismailism in Transoxania (Ma wara an-nahr in Arabic) was related to the broader Shi‘a
Ismaili da’wa of that era. Central Asia was a hub of pro-Ali insurgences, one of which, led by Abu Mus-
lim Khurasani, brought the fall of the Umayyads in 750 CE. After the Abbasid’s takeover and their sub-
sequent repression of the Alids, the da’wa was renewed in Central Asia, where several prominent hujjats
and da’is3  disseminated the Ismaili interpretation of Islam. Several prominent among them were Abu
Abdallah Al-Khadim, Hussain bin Ali al-Marvazi, Abu Ya’qub Sijistani, and Muhammad bin Ahmad an-
Nasafi (also known as al-Nakhshabi). Accumulatively, these da’is managed to infuse the Ismaili vision
into the Samanids’ court and even convert their Emir Nasr II bin Ahmad Samani (914-943 CE). Many
great scholars of that time, such as the poet Rudaki4  and vizier Bal’ami who served in that court eventu-
ally converted to Ismailism. Moreover, Ismailism gave birth to some of the most famous thinkers of the
1
 See: A. Bennigsen, Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1985.
2
 See: F. Daftary, Ismailis. Their History and Doctrine, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
3
 The hujjat (da’i) is a particular figure in the Ismaili hierarchy who serves at a given time as an evidence, or a proof, among
mankind, of God’s will; it also means a rank following that of the Imam. Ismaili doctrines divided the inhabited earth into twelve
regions; each region’s da’wa hierarchy was headed by a hujjat (see: I. Poonawala, “Ismaili ta’wil of the Qur’an,” in: Approaches
to the History of the Interpretations of the Qur’an, ed. by A. Rippin, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 216).
4
 Rudaki (856-941) is considered the father of classical Persian-Tajik literature.
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Muslim world, such as Abu Ali ibn Sina, Al-Biruni and Firdousi. These were either Ismailis5  or closely
affiliated with its spirit of faith, intellect, and justice.
Ghaznawid (962-1186 CE) and Seljuk (1034-1300 CE) rulers used ruthless political and military
campaigns against the Ismailis across Central Asia to Sind in the name of a jihad against heresy. Persecut-
ing every non-Sunni sect, Sultan Mahmud was granted legitimacy from Baghdad’s Khalif al Qadir who
encouraged him in the atrocities and “bestowed” upon him titles such as Nizam ud-din, Naser ul-Haq and
so on. These terrible oppressions were taking place against Ismailis in the eastern part of the Muslim world
in the name of God, religion and justice. A contemporary to Nizam ul-Mulk justified the brutality against
those who thought differently during the NK’s time as follows: “Killing them (i.e. the Batiniya and the
heretics.—S.N.) is cleaner (i.e. a job that is purer.—S.N.) than the water of the rain and is an obligation of
the sultans and kings, who must convict them and destroy them so as to clear the Earth from their dirt. No
one should have friendship with them, talk to them, eat the meat they sell. It is more favourable to release
the blood of a heretic than to kill seventy infidel citizens of Byzantium.”6
This situation resulted in the migration of Ismaili adherents from the valleys and cities of Khuras-
an and Transoxania to the remote mountainous areas such as Mazanderan and Badakhshan. It is not
accidental, therefore, that the great Ismaili thinker and missionary of Imam Al-Mustansir bi-Allah—
Nasir Khusraw—took refuge in Badakhshan and spent the rest of his life here.7  His success in spread-
ing the Ismaili teaching was made possible because the local ruler of Badakhshan, Ali ibn Asad, was an
early Ismaili convert. Another wave of Ismaili refugees to Badakhshan was possibly related to the fall
of the Ismailis in Multan and later in Alamut. The story of the four legendary dervishes/missionaries—
Shoh Khomush, Shoh Burhon, Shoh Malang and Shoh Koshon—to Badakhshan is often associated with
this period.8
The development of the post-Mongol history of Central Asia coincides with the creation of ethno-
religious states (e.g., Shi‘ite Safawid in Iran, and Sunni Timurid and Shaibanid in Central Asia). Numer-
ous assaults of Mongols and Turkic rulers in the name of Islam subjected those whose faith did not fit
within the “canonical” interpretation of religion to barbaric genocides. The history of this brutality con-
tinued during the pre-modern times with the creation of Afghanistan, which together with Bokhara Emir-
ate competed in enslaving and repressing the region’s Ismailis. All this considerably reduced the Ismaili
influence in Central Asia. Throughout the post-Mongol period and after, Ismailism survived largely due
to the geographical remoteness and the institute of pirship whose structures, in the physical absence of the
ever-present Imam due to adversities of time, resembled Sufi Tariqahs.
Toward the middle of the 19th century, the Great Game initiated by imperialist Great Britain
and Russia fragmented the region further and turned it into zones of interest. Russo-British rivalry
cut across people’s religious and cultural connections. Consequently, the Ismailis were divided be-
tween Russia, Afghanistan, Britain, and China. Ever since, the Ismailis’ destinies have been intimately
linked to the political histories of the nation-states in the region. Gilgit and Chitral with their subre-
gions, as segments of British colonies, ended up in India and later Pakistan. Afghan Badakhshan has
undergone endless tumultuous experiences under the Afghan royal dynasties from Amir Abdurrah-
man Khan to Mohamed Dawud, followed by the Communist regime (1979-1992), and the subsequent
wars between the Mujahideens and the Taliban (1992-2001). The Ismailis who lived on the Eastern
Pamir Mountains (Sarikol) were incorporated into China. Together with the rest of the Chinese peo-
ple, they have experienced Cultural Revolution, militant atheism and the relative cultural revival since
the 1980s.
The course of the Russian Ismailis under Russian/Soviet rule is the focus of the following dis-
cussion. Their history is punctuated by a series of ups and downs, moments of relief followed by
5
 Abu Ali ibn Sina (980-1037) was born to Ismaili parents in Bukhara. For Firdousi’s Ismaili affinity see his comedy on
Sultan Mahmud the Ghaznawid.
6
 N. Arabzoda, Nosir Khusraw. Study of Philosophical Theories, Maorif, Dushanbe, 1994, p. 41 (in Tajik).
7
 See: A. Hunsberger, Nasir Khusraw. The Ruby of Badakhshan. A Portrait of the Persian Poet, Traveler and Philosopher,
IB. Tauris in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, 2000.
8
 See: A. Boldyrev, Istoriya Badakhshana, Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo Universtiteta, Leningrad, 1959.
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traumatic social cataclysm. On the positive side, the Russians salvaged the Ismailis from the brutal
repressions and conversions by their non-Ismaili neighbors. A.V. Postnikov referring to the earlier
Russian sources on Badakhshani Ismailis brings an incident that vividly describes the continuity of
sufferings of the local people, as a result of their neighbors’ incursions, which were in turn caused
by imperial forces dominating the region: “In 1889 the Afghans occupied the separated Shugnan and
Rushan again, and their occupation was accompanied with brutality and atrocities unheard of in Central
Asia’s entire history. The population in the captured territories was slaughtered entirely, their vil-
lages burnt and their fields poisoned and so on. Running away from the Afghans, a part of the Shug-
nan population ran to lake Yashilkul, hoping to move either to Sarikol (in China.—S.N.) or to Rus-
sia. The Chinese forces in Kashgar led by Chen-Dzarina, worrying that the Afghans may, by hunting
the Shugnanis, cross to China sent their force to Yashilkul to return the Shugnanis to Shugnan, which
was already occupied by the Afghans. Moreover, their leader also informed the Afghans that the
Shugnanis were being repatriated. The Afghans met the devastated Shugnanis and slaughtered all of
them entirely.”9
A similar experience of historical suffering, persecutions and perseverance resulting from a differ-
ence in identity is mentioned by a pioneer of Ismaili studies, Ivanow: “My learned friends in Europe plainly
disbelieved me when I wrote about the community to them. It appeared to them quite unbelievable that
the most brutal persecution, wholesale slaughter, age-long hostility and suppression were unable to anni-
hilate the community which even at its highest formed but a small minority in the country. Only later on,
however, when my contact with them grew more intimate, I was able to see the reasons for such surpris-
ing vitality. It was their quite extraordinary devotion and faithfulness to the tradition of their ancestors,
the ungrudging patience with which they suffered all the calamities and misfortunes, cherishing no illu-
sions whatsoever as to what they could expect in life and in the contact with their majority fellow coun-
trymen. They with amazing care and devotion kept through ages burning that Light, mentioned in the
Koran, which God always protects against all attempts of His enemies to extinguish it. I rare saw any-
thing so extraordinary and impressive as this ancient tradition being devoutly preserved in the poor mud-
dy huts of mountain hamlets or poor villages in the desert.”10
The Russians, and thereafter the Soviets, considered Badakhshan (also known as Pamir) as an ex-
ample of socialist revolution in Muslim East and invested heavily in its modernization. In the Soviet period
(i.e., 1917-1991), the region was renamed the Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Province and in-
corporated into the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan. The Tajik Ismailis played a vital role in the
creation and development of Tajik statehood.11  The Soviets subsequently built modern schools, hospi-
tals, cultural centers, powerhouses, roads, and airports in all major areas of the province. Free education
was provided from kindergarten to doctoral studies. The literacy rate increased from less than 2% in 1913
to more than 99% in 1984. Badakhshan stood amongst the first in the whole of the Soviet Union in terms
of the number of holders of higher education degrees. It produced a great number of highly educated
professionals who made valuable contribution to Tajik society.12  The improved health, education, social
welfare and security resulted in rapid demographic change and greater mobility. Many Ismailis migrated
to Tajikistan’s lowlands and other parts of the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, Soviet times also witnessed periods of forced collectivization of agriculture,
during which lands were nationalized and certain types of crop production (e.g., tobacco) were forced
upon people. The forced migration of the mountainous Ismailis to the southern lowlands of Tajikistan
with its radically different climatic conditions in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the death of thou-
sands. Under various pretexts, and through unfounded accusations such as bourgeois nationalists, of
being “agents” of British imperialism, and disloyal, Stalinist purges eliminated a great number of Is-
9
 A.V. Postnikov, Skhvatka na “Kryshe Mira”, Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli series, Moscow, 2001, pp. 273-274.
10
 W. Ivanow, “My First Meeting with the Ismailis in Persia,” in: Shi‘a Imami Ismailia, s.a., pp. 3-4.
11
 See: R. Masov, The History of National Catastrophe, University of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, 1996.
12
 See: M. Nazarshoev & N. Nazarshoev, Sokhtmoni madani dar Badakhsoni Soveti (Cultural construction in Soviet Ba-
dakhshan), Maorif, Dushanbe, 1984 (in Tajik).
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maili political, intellectual, and cultural elites. The influence of Soviet industrialization also remained
minimal: apart from a few powerhouses and light-industry factories, no significant production sites were
built. The people’s basic necessities were provided from outside rather than produced locally. The local
youth was encouraged to move to other parts of the Soviet Union to fill deficit workplaces in the labor
market. A cultural revolution was carried out in the name of creating a “new Soviet human being,” who
was to be above religious, ethnic and cultural “prejudices.” The underlying agenda was that eventually
this “Soviet human being” should have not become much different from an enriched Russian modern
citizen.13  Although education was free and total, its quality and relevance to the community’s develop-
ment remained questionable.
The Soviet’s harshest blows came upon people’s faith. The Communists consistently regarded re-
ligion as myth, superstition and fanaticism. In 1936 the Tajik-Afghan border was sealed. This resulted in
disconnecting the Ismailis of Tajikistan from their Afghan-side brothers and sisters. Their ties with their
Imam (spiritual leader) became physically impossible, but never completely severed. Under the pressure
of militant atheism, the local Pirs were either jailed or fled the country. Khalifas went underground. Per-
formance of public rites and rituals were forbidden. During this period, the performance of the basic re-
ligious sunnats such as prayer, hajj, Idi Qurban, fasting, and of rituals such as janaza, khatna, nikah, cha-
roghrawshan and madohoni (see further) became a highly risky endeavor.
This policy was relaxed during Khrushchev. When the Soviets realized the impossibility of eradi-
cating religion, they changed their tactics rather than the overall repressive attitude: In order to keep re-
ligion under their control, the Soviets created official religious structures. Khalifas were appointed by the
state, but still, the observance of religious practices remained a highly private and concealed domain of
social life. Despite all this, people’s religiosity increased. One of the great lessons of the Soviet experi-
ence is that one cannot eradicate people’s existing beliefs by imposing on them a new theory that is per-
ceived as superior and “science-based truth.”14  The last decades of Soviet experience revealed the failure
of the communists’ claims to provide justice, equity and prosperity for the majority. This period is marked
by system’s total crisis, reflected in its economic, educational and moral decline. As a result, Badakhshan,
despite some important changes and development projects, remained the poorest region of Tajikistan in
the Soviet Union.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Ismailis, excited by the promises of Perestroika and Glasnost, became
involved in broader political, cultural, and religious movements. Their cooperation with the Democratic
and Islamic forces of Tajikistan resulted in the loss of the latter forces in the political struggle for power.
This led to tragic losses of human life and material resources. A considerable number of the Ismailis fell
prey during the civil war. Both during the war and afterwards, many lowland Ismailis took refuge in
Badakhshan and other parts of the former Soviet Union. From 1992-1993, Badakhshan was cut off from
the rest of Tajikistan and the former U.S.S.R. and left to its own devices. It is at this time that many people
immersed in reflection over the recent and remote past, recovering their roots and history of sufferings.
How is it that such a highly educated community ended up so poor? How is it that such an educated com-
munity fell prey to populist slogans that drew the community into the flames of devastating civil war?
What is going to happen to us now? Are we returning to the old animosities? How to build new relations
with the others in Tajikistan and Russia? How are we going to feed the population that has rapidly in-
creased in Soviet times and inflated by the arrival of the displaced people?—these were some of the major
questions people began to ask.
The post-Soviet era has also become a period of great news and mass exhilaration for events such as
the arrival of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), the establishment of the connection with the
Imam and the global Ismaili community. Since 1993, the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) has provided basic
13
 N. Belkanov, “Russian Education for Non-Russian Peoples. A Sample of Colonial Policy?” Russian Education and Society,
Vol. 39, No. 9, 1997, p. 29.
14
 S. Niyozov, Understanding Teaching in Post-Soviet, Rural and Mountainous Tajikistan: Case Studies of Teachers’ Life
and Work, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, 2001, p. 96.
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food and clothing that saved the population of the Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Province from
a humanitarian disaster.15  Since then, it has been the major supporter of the local Government in creating
grassroots involvement and technical support in all post-Soviet reforms, including privatizing the land,
providing technical agricultural assistance, improving health, enhancing communications, hydropow-
er generation and supporting the development of small businesses and industries. AKF’s support has
been crucial for the education system’s survival through the years of independence. Since 1997, AKF
has been involved in assisting the provincial Department of Education to enhance and upgrade teach-
ers’ knowledge and skills, strengthen education managers, increase the involvement of parents and
community in education, establish an education revolving fund, and reconstruct the Institute for the
Improvement of Teacher Qualifications in Khorog. AKF has annually been offering scholarships to a
number of students from Khorog State University, to pursue Bachelors’ degrees in Moscow and Bishkek.
Together with the Aga Khan University (AKU), the AKF has been involved in the training MBAP
education personnel through the visiting teachers, management, and Master’s degree courses at the
Institute for Educational Development of the Aga Khan University (IED/AKU). Aga Khan Education
services opened the first private school in MBAP in 1999. In response to requests from a number of
Tajik intellectuals, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture has established a humanities project in Central Asia.
Its approach rests on consolidating the achievements of the three civilizations that have met in Central
Asia—Islam, Soviet Socialism and Western democracy—to fill the vacuum created by the departure of
the Communist ideology. Since 1996, the Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS) initiated a major educational
project in Tajikistan, which aims at the balanced development of citizens through the teaching of ethics
and knowledge. The program utilizes the existing educational facilities and teachers in implementing
its program. The curriculum package includes textbooks, activity books, and guides for teachers and
parents. The IIS has also provided scholarships to prepare the foundational skills of a great number of
Central Asian students in Humanities and Islamic studies. The students can then receive graduate de-
grees in various western universities. In 2001 the University of Central Asia, the first of its kind to
study the realities of mountain people, was established in several of Central Asian capitals with Khorog
being the site of the largest center.
Apart from these, the two visits of His Highness the Aga Khan to Tajikistan in 1995 and 1998 were
moving experiences for the people of the region. For the first time in centuries, the Ismailis of Badakhshan
met with their Imam of the Time. These visits took on an even greater significance because of their tim-
ing16: The historic visits coincided with the spiritual expectations of the devastated population of Bada-
khshan, recovering as it was from the recent bloodshed and human and material losses. The present au-
thor in his study of teachers’ lives and work in Tajikistan’s Badakhshan quotes one of the participants of
his study in this regard as follows: “Some people thought we would all die soon or become slaves to oth-
ers as a result of our defeat in the civil war. With the arrival of the Imom we all felt that, though we are
a small and very poor people, we have got a strong protector and guide. From 1993 to 1997 there was no
major problem with basic foods. The Aga Khan Foundation also provided us with clothes, shoes and some
textbooks. For us, as teachers, some of the most touching words were Hozir Imom’s17  appeal for educa-
tion when he said that teaching is the noblest profession. He asked us to carry on our work and to seek
knowledge...”18
During both his visits, His Highness the Aga Khan stressed the importance of peaceful coexist-
ence, education and ethics. In short, the spiritual, emotional, financial, educational and material pres-
15
 It is hard to imagine what could have happened to the MBAP, and even Tajikistan, if there were no external assist-
ance. Since 1993, in MBAP only, several international organizations, such as AKDN, the U.N. World Food Program, Mé-
decins Sans Frontièrs (MSF), Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Save the Children, have been fighting against poverty and health
epidemics.
16
 For more on the visits of the Aga Khan to Tajikistan see a special issue of Ismaili, London, 1995.
17
 Hozir Imom, also Hazir Imam (i.e., ever-present Imam) is an Ismaili theosophical concept, which refers to the eternal
nature of the concept of Imam as a guide of Muslims since the death of Prophet Muhammad.
18
 S. Niyozov, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
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ence of the AKDN has helped the Pamiris to rejoin postwar Tajikistan as a revitalized and confident
community.
Amongst many other changes, these visits substantially raised self-confidence of the population,
sparked hope within many people, and contributed to the peace process. This considerably enhanced the
relations between the Ismailis and their non-Ismaili neighbors in both Tajik and Afghan Badakhshans.
Khan captures this improvement through the voice of one of his participants: “Fortunately, in Badakhshan
we do not face enmity and religious persecution from others as much as Ismailis in other regions. People
of one village may be Ismailis and others Sunnis but they live together peacefully. Let me tell you an
incident. At the time of Hazir Imam’s dîdâr in 1998 in Ishkashim, the Sunnis worked as much as the Is-
mailis. They carried stones on their skirts to build the stage. And on the day of dîdâr, not only the Ismailis
but also Sunnis were walking together along with their children at three o’clock in the morning and sit-
ting together under the scorching sun.”19
While the above was an Ismaili participant’s voice, Niyozov indicates this positive development
was genuine. He does so through a non-Ismaili’s reaction to the way the Aga Khan Foundation’s relief
program has contributed to the mutual acceptance and coexistence. This voice is vital, particularly in the
post-Soviet period, wherein old enmities are being instigated by certain forces pursuing their own polit-
ical agendas: “The mullahs in our district were totally mystified to see trucks with goods coming and coming
endlessly … bringing the basic necessities right from America and Canada on a free basis. This changed
their attitude toward the Ismailis. They stopped considering them as kafirs. They stopped telling us not to
marry women from Rushan and Shugnan. They accepted the Aga Khan as a truly caring and blessed Muslim
person.”20
Currently, about 200,000 Tajik Ismailis live in the Badakhshan province, while a similar number of
Ismailis lives in the rest of Tajikistan. There are also a considerable number of Ismailis who have migrat-
ed to Kyrgyzstan (Osh and Bishkek), Kazakhstan (Almaty) and Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Saratov
and other cities).
Some of the Distinct Features
of the Ismaili Community
in Badakhshan of Central Asia
The Badakhshani Ismailis consider themselves as historically grounded part of the Muslim Ummah,
and their claims are authenticated not simply by their adherence to common Islamic principles, but also
by the guidance of their Imam, and by the legacy of their Da’i Nasir Khusraw and his disciples in the
history. Regardless of being minorities in their native countries, the Ismailis have been able to build friendly
relations with the majority of the non-Ismaili Muslims of Central Asia.
At the same time, the Central Asian Ismailis represent significant majorities in their particular ge-
ographic areas. Local governments represented by themselves, as well as the basic legal tenets of their
respective states provide them with an opportunity to preserve their distinct identities. Secondly, the Central
Asian Ismailis, as is the case with the broader Nasir Khusraw tradition, largely inhabit isolated mountain-
ous terrains, which provide enormous challenges to their development and communication with the rest
of the world. Thirdly, the tradition disseminated by the great thinker and scholar Nasir Khusraw histor-
ically favored and cherished knowledge, intellect and education. It draws on synthesizing Islamic revela-
tion with neo-Platonic system of thought,21  and the centrality of intellectual tradition in the Fatimid pe-
19
 M. Khan, Ismaili Traditions in Nasir Khusraw Context: A Study of the Ismaili Practices in Afghan Badakshan, An In-
ternal Report available at the Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, U.K., s.a., p. 105.
20
 S. Niyozov, op. cit., p. 345.
21
 See: A. Hunsberger, op. cit.; I. Poonawala, op. cit., pp. 199-222.
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riod.22  Education and intellectual development are seen as powerful forces that could enable the commu-
nity to successfully face and reshape commercialization, consumerism, individualism, competition and
other realities of free market and neoliberalism in post-Soviet Tajikistan and to ensure that the intellectu-
al and ethical aspects remain central to community’s existence.
Fourth, Tajik Ismailis as one of the oldest Ismaili communities have creatively incorporated some
of the famous pre-Islamic Mithraist, Zoroastrian and other rites. These traditions have become Ismaili in
content to the degree that many scholars claim that these rituals have always been Islamic.23  One of these
traditions is charoghrawshan (tsirow-pithid in Shugnani24 ). Tsirow-pithid begins with the gathering in
the deceased’s house on the third day after the death, which is accompanied by the singing of Madohs
(devotional poetry from classical poets such as Rumi, Hafiz, Nasir Khusraw, Attar, Sanoi, etc.). Close to
the ceremony’s end, a candle, created from the fat and wool of a freshly-slaughtered sheep, is lit, accom-
panied by the continuous recitation of special prayers. It is believed that the soul of the deceased will thus
be purified by the recitation of the special prayers, light, and devotional poetry, and leave the house and
find rest in eternity.
Another factor is the peculiar structure of the Pamiri house (cheed, chod in local languages). Some
students of history believe that the five pillars of the house that used to hold the names of the Mithraist
and Zoroastrian angels were renamed after the members of Ahl al-Bait: the Prophet Muhammad, his daugh-
ter Fatima, his cousin and son-in-law, the Imam Ali, and their children Hasan and Hussein. The Ismailis
of Badakhshan also celebrate Nawruz as a broad cultural celebration marked throughout Tajikistan. Since
1995, i.e. after His Highness’ historic visit to Badakhshan, the local Ismailis started to celebrate Rooze
Noor (the Day of Light) on the 25th of May. This day is a celebration where religious and cultural aspects
are brought together. Lastly, the Tajik Ismailis have also incorporated a number of Sufi traditions such as
paying tributes to the shrines and ostons (mazars), which have served them to maintain their identity and
connection with God throughout Soviet antireligious campaigns.
E p i l o g u e
Rapid changes triggered by the sudden collapse of the U.S.S.R., civil war, emerging capitalist
and market relations have caught by surprise all the Soviet people including the Tajik and other Bada-
khshan Ismaili communities. Apart from the positive aspects mentioned above, forces of change also
brought some important challenges such as to contend with poverty, unemployment, warlord culture,
drugs, and migration. The values of neoliberalism and free market economy (such as individualist free-
dom, competition, consumerism, and commercialization of existing values and goods) have made it
more difficult for minority and marginalized communities living in already unfavorable geographic and
economic conditions. In spite of these problems, nevertheless, with love for, faith in, and support from
their Imam, the cooperation between his Network and the local Governments, and the assistance of the
other international agencies across the globe, the Badakhshani Ismailis believe they will continue to
make a positive contribution to the development of their societies and find their place within the Mus-
lim and global community in general. It will be possible because of the living intellectual tradition,
their history of contribution, their values of tolerance and engagement and their abilities to work hard
and to endure hardships.
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 See: H. Halm, The Fatimids and their Traditions of Learning, I.B. Tauris in association with the IIS, London, 1993.
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 See: N. Hunzai, Chiraghi Rawshan, Khonai Hikmat, Karachi, 1993, p. 11.
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 Shugnani is a major ethnic language in Badakhshan.
